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Summary. - The Turkish structural adjustment since 1980 has been associated with chronic instability. 
Since the late 1980s. the weaknesses in the fiscal system and the premature external liberalization emerge 
as the main factors hindering the passage toward stable growth. Enforced and erratic distributional changes 
and relative stagnation ofcapital accumulation have undermined the growth potential of the economy. Fur- 
ther, it is demonstrated that existing market structures may negate nvironmental policies based on market 
incentives. These observations, as well as those on the interactions of the market system and the environ- 
ment, create strong arguments in favor of an active state. 
1. RECENT ECONOMIC HISTORY 
(a) A synopsis of reforms and theirphasing 
At the time of the writing of this paper (September 
1994), the Turkish economy had not yet recovered 
from a major financial crisis culminating between 
December 1993 and May 1994, with severe repercus- 
sions on the real side of the economy. Although desta- 
bilizing forces leading to financial misfortunes begin- 
ning in 1989 and extremely buoyant economic activity 
in 1993 gave signs of an impending breakdown, this 
paper excludes this recent phase, since it is too early to 
undertake a comprehensive analysis. The study covers 
1981 to 1992-93; the earlier crisis of 1978-79 as well 
as the following year characterized by an orthodox 
shock treatment and the consequent relative price 
realignment are excluded. For purposes of comparison 
with the precrisis years of the 1970s either 1976 or 
1977 is taken as a point of reference. 
Economic policies followed during 1981-1992 did 
not deviate from the basic philosophy of orthodox 
structural adjustment, but the same cannot be argued 
with respect to conventional stabilization policies, 
particularly during the second half of the period. On 
the basis of policy shifts, three subperiods, i.e. 
1981-83,1984-88 and 1989-92 are delineated (Table 
1). There are some peculiar features of 1988 in terms 
of quantitative indicators since this year saw a final 
(and unsuccessful) attempt at fiscal and monetary 
restraint with a view to correcting macro imbalances 
which had been gaining momentum from 1986 
onwards (see Table 2). With this qualification in mind, 
the determining features of the three subperiods are as 
follows: 
- 1981-83 is the “military phase” characterized 
by enforced incomes policies, with emphasis on 
stabilization as a sequel to the shock treatment of 
1980, deregulation of internal commodity markets 
and clumsy and disastrous moves into financial lib- 
eralization. 
- 1984-8 (with the exception of 1988) can be 
labeled the “golden years” of Motherland Party 
(MP) and its then leader, Mr. ozal. Decisive steps 
were taken in this subperiod toward trade and 
financial liberalization. The emphasis was put on 
structural adjustment and the necessary institution- 
building. Starting in 1985, expansionary fiscal 
policies and a public investment boom led to a vir- 
tual neglect of stabilization objectives. On the 
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other hand, the institutional and legal instruments 
inherited from the military phase continued to be 
used effectively to control labor incomes 
- The third phase signifies a “return to populism” 
plus external financial liberalization.” A wage 
explosion accompanied by higher agricultural 
prices led to further worsening of public sector 
finances. Privatization began to be seen as a substi- 
tute for fiscal reform. Short-term capital move- 
ments in response to fluctuations in exchange and 
interest rates created erratic changes in external 
accounts.’ 
A few supplementary remarks on the indicators 
given in Table 2 may be useful: 
- Once the initial slack in the economy which 
In the context of a three-gap growth model (see, 
inter alia, Bacha 1990) the saving constraint turns 
out to be the least binding in the first subperiod. For 
the successive subperiods, fiscal and foreign 
exchange (FX) constraints respectively seem to be 
the least binding.2 
contributed to a relatively rapid pace of recovery 
- Neither current nor constant price calculations 
and growth in the first two subperiods was 
exhausted, the economy settled down to slower 
growth. The potential growth rate of the Turkish 
of average savings and investment propensities 
economy moved to a lower plateau during the 
indicate a significant and permanent improvement 
1980s and the early 1990s. A 4.1% p.a. of potential 
GDP growth rate for the period under study com- 
pares poorly with the growth path of earlier 
decades. 
-The aftermath of MP’s boom is characterized by 
the shortening of the growth cycle. The post- 1987 
growth average of 3.7% p.a. is made up of two 
above-trend performances in 1990 and 1992 and 
three years of declining per capita income 
(1988-89 and 1991). 1993 and 1994 also seem to 
fit well into this pattern of demand-led boom and 
the bust which sets in shortly after the ceiling of 
potential output is reached. 
Table 1. Subperiods based on economicpolicy shifs, 1981-92 
Policies 1981-83 1984-88 1989-92 
Financial 
system 
Fiscal 
system 
Public 
enterprises 
(PEs) 
Incomes 
policies 
External 
policies 
Macro 
policies & 
others 
Diversification of financial 
instruments (FIs); freeing 
interest rates (i); bankers’ 
scandal; partial reversal 
Attempt o reduce 
spending & increase taxes 
PE accounts improve due 
to price increases 
Military control of labor 
@)-market; agricultural 
support policies (ASP) curbed 
Real depreciation (RD); import 
quotas reduced, heavy X- 
subsidies (XS); some forex 
controls (FC) lifted 
Monetary restraint through 
CB credit controls, deregulation 
of internal markets 
Environmental A series of environmental l ws 
policies and regulations based on 
“polluter pays” principle, with 
limited enforcement and open 
evasions 
Interest rate policy under Interbank money and forex 
Central Bank (CB) control; markets with CB as participant; 
multiplication ofFIs; gradual freed interest rates monitored 
domination of gov’t bonds (GBs) by CB 
Lowering tax burden on High interest burden on budget; 
business, rentiers &high Treasury - CB conflict on 
incomes; value-added tax financing public deficit (PD) 
(VAT) adopted; higher 
spending after 1984 
Privatization (PN) agency set 
up; minority shares old; debt 
financing of PE investments 
PN seen as major evenue source; 
debt burden worsens PE accounts 
Anti-L, anti-farm, prorentier 
policies; L militancy in 1988 
Return to populism on wages & 
ASP 
Crawling peg targeting RD; XS All FC lifted; fully liberal K- 
remain; imports liberalized, account; market-based xchange 
external borrowing by firms rate; real appreciation 
&banks eased 
Reduced control over PD, 
attempt at fiscal restraint in 
1988 
Indirect axation on energy 
inputs: Energy costs accelerate 
over private producer prices 
while energy/output ratios am 
not affected 
Control over PD & internal 
debt growth lost; CB loses ground 
on monetary policy 
Ministry of Environment (ME) 
founded in 1991; efforts to 
administer an earmark 
environmental funding system 
under ME 
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Table 2. Major indicatorsfor subperiods, 1981-92 (index numbers (1977: 100) andpercentages) 
1981-83 1984-87 1988 1989-92 
GDP Growth, % pa. 5.0 6.9 2.1 3.7 
Main macroeconomic aggregates 
as % of GNP* 
- CAD, 2.4 1.7 -1.7 0.3 
- SC 14.6 15.7 20.1 16.3 
- 1, 17.0 17.4 18.4 16.6 
- PSBRc 2.9 2.2 1.7 5.3 
- CAD, 0.5 0.8 -2.8 -0.7 
- S, 19.0 18.1 20.7 18.9 
- 1, 15.0 18.9 17.9 18.2 
- PSBR, 3.1 2.2 1.2 5.3 
Inflation, % p.a.t 31.4 38.8 68.3 60.5 
Capacity utilization rate, %$ 88.5 95.1 97.6 96.9 
Real wages 77.0 63.3 68.9 93.76 
TOTAR 60.7 63.0 50.0 65.4 
REERII 123.7 148.0 151.9 128.9 
Real interest rates, %** 
- With ref. to current inflation 8.W 12.9 25.9 9.53X 
-With ref. to future inflation O.OVt 10.6 30.9 12.4$$ 
*Subscripts c and r in the following rows refer to current price and real (1987) price calculations. respectively. 
tin terms of WPI. 
$Method of calculation is described in Boratav and Tiirel(l989). 
§For 1989-90. 
uerms of trade for agriculture on the basis of implicit GDP deflators. 
IlBased on Uygur (1991) for 1981-90 and on Central Bank end-of-year estimates for 1991-92, this is real effective 
exchange rate for a basket of foreign currencies. Its increase signifies real depreciation of TL and vice versa. 
**Average bank lending rates based on Akkurt et al. (1991) deflated by WPI. 
ttRefers to 1982-83. 
#Refers to 1989-90. 
over the past decades. As will be discussed later, 
the stagnation and even erosion of overall invest- 
ment rates are linked to substantial declines in pub- 
lic investment which is not made up by private 
investment. (See Table 5.) 
- Current account deficit (CAD)/GNP ratios, 
when averaged over the subperiods, give the 
impression of an overall improvement in external 
balance. Despite the appearance of alleviation of 
the chronic deficit position after 1988 with three 
surplus years, annual figures exhibit erratic and 
easily reversible movements. Following liberaliza- 
tion, the capital account also became more volatile. 
- The corrective effort to stem the rising trend of 
PSBR in 1988 turned out to be abortive when infla- 
tion moved onto a new and higher (60% p.a.) 
plateau from one around 30% p.a. in absence of 
significant cost-push elements. Despite the “wage 
explosion” and increased public deficits, the rate of 
inflation did not accelerate after 1988, but settled 
on this higher plateau. Real appreciation of the 
Turkish lira (TL) apparently alleviated inflationary 
pressures. 
-Wages and agricultural terms of trade indicators 
for the last two subperiods reveal the extent of the 
post-1988 distributional changes - a drastic 
reversal of earlier trends which is studied in more 
detail in Boratav, Tiirkcan and Yeldan (1994). 
Although subject to sizable fluctuations, positive 
and sometimes very high interest rates prevailed 
throughout 1981 to 1992-93. Despite the apprecia- 
tion in the last subperiod, TL remained depreciated 
in real terms, in comparison to the values in the late 
1970s and in 1980. 
Despite the comprehensive economic and institu- 
tional reforms, environmental protection has never- 
theless been a neglected component of policy action in 
Turkey. Even though environmental concerns have 
been explicitly voiced in various policy documents, 
the country still lacks a sound environmental research 
and action program. Environmental policy-relevant 
research is still at its infancy; existing data are limited 
to air and water pollution in provincial areas, and is of 
dubious quality. On the other hand, the existing envi- 
ronmental policies are put into effect through a mix of 
pervasive but hardly enforceable controls and polluter 
charges which are neither comprehensive nor suffi- 
cient to prevent continuing environmental degrada- 
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Table 3. Decomposition of changes in external deficit, 1981-92 (as percentages ofpotential outpuf)* 
1981-84 1984-87 1987-88 1988-92 
Change in external Deficit’ -0.2 -1.3 -2.6 +2.3 
External shock component +1.3 -2.8 -1.0 -1.7 
(Terms of trade changes)$ +0.6 -2.8 +1.3 a.9 
(World trade expansion) +l.O +0.8 -1.0 -0.5 
(Interest rate shock) -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
(Change in transfers) -0.2 -0.6 -1.2 -0.2 
Debt burden component$ +o.s +0.4 +0.4 -0.7 
Policy component -2.0 +1.2 -2.0 +4.7 
(Increase in u)cfi +0.2 +0.3 -0.1 -0.0 
(Import compression)” +2.6 +2.5 -1.3 +3.0 
(Export penetration)** -4.8 -1.6 -0.6 +1.8 
* figures may not sum up to totals because of rounding. 
t Negative figures imply reduction in balance of payments deficit relative to potential output. 
$ Positive figures imply adverse changes. 
8 Positive figures imply adverse changes. The negative value for 1988-92 is due to real appreciation of TL. 
I u: rate of capacity utilization. 
I’ Negative figures imply import compression. 
** Negative figures indicate export penetration due to reduced absorption. 
Source: Boratav, Tiirel and Yeldan (1994), p.7, 
1981-92 
-1.8 
-4.3 
-1.9 
+0.3 
a.5 
-2.2 
+0.5 
+2.0 
+o.s 
+6.8 
-5.3 
tion. In parallel with the general tenor of the post- 1980 
reforms, Turkish environmental authorities (mostly 
with the support of the World Bank and other interna- 
tional donors) also tried to design market-based policy 
measures and thus shift from regulation to price mech- 
anisms in the realm of environmental management. 
Most of these measures however have not been imple- 
mented yet, mainly due to the lack of political will and 
proper organizational structures to administer envi- 
ronmentally sound tax/subsidy schemes. 
(b) Decomposition of changes in external andfiscal 
gaps 
Constituent elements of changes in external and fis- 
cal gaps in line with Gibson’s (1991) decomposition 
framework are presented below. Although there are 
quite diverse movements in the subperiods, only the 
picture for the entire period as shown in the last 
columns of Tables 3 and 4 is described here.l 
Over the entire 12-year span, the reduction in for- 
eign savings/potential output ratio (s,) by 1.8 percent- 
age points was essentially realized by favorable exter- 
nal conditions: A decline of 3.8 percentage points in 
foreign savings is accounted by the “external shock” 
component, after allowing for the impact of the debt 
burden; 2.2 percentage points out of the 3.8 are due to 
the rise in service exports and other invisibles. 
Although in the model framework these latter cate- 
gories are incorporated in the “external shock” com- 
ponent, it should be noted that they are also responsive 
to policy variables. Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
adverse international developments which dominated 
1973-81 were, as a whole, reversed in the following 
period. 
On the policy front, the impact of import liberaliza- 
tion (leading to a 6.8 percentage points rise in s,) more 
than offset the positive impact of the export drive pro- 
ducing a 5.3 percentage point decline in sf. Hence, 
contrary to the widespread belief, economic policies, 
in toto, contributed to rises in external deficits by 2.0 
percentage points. Had these policy choices produced 
an overall neutral impact on sr the Turkish economy in 
the early 1990s could have attained a modest, but per- 
sistent surplus in balance of payments instead of 
erratic movements. 
Over 1981-92, a rise in 2.0 percentage points in 
PSBR is essentially explained by domestic interest 
rate shocks and changes in the domestic debt burden 
which account for a rise by 2.7 percentage points. The 
mildly favorable impact of external and policy compo- 
nents (-0.2 and -0.5 percentage points, respectively) 
account for the rest. Although the method of decom- 
position includes the impact of local interest rates in 
the “domestic shock” component, in the Turkish con- 
text it is essentially a policy-determined factor. One 
can conclude that the deterioration of public sector 
finances over time is, to a large degree, the outcome of 
costly domestic borrowing schemes, which toward the 
end of the period started to acquire the characteristics 
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Table 4. Decomposition f changes in PSBR, 1981-92 (as percentages ofpotential ouputJ* 
1981-84 198&87 1987-88 1988-92 1981-92 
Change in PSBRt -2.3 +1.7 -1.8 c4.4 +2.0 
External shock component +0.3 +o. 1 +0.3 -0.9 -0.2 
(Debt burden) +0.4 +0.3 +0.3 -0.8 +0.3 
(Interest rate shock) -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 
Domestic shock component 
(Debt burden) 
(Interest rate shock) 
+0.3 +l.O +0.7 co.8 +2.7 
-0.2 +0.8 -0.0 +o. 1 +0.7 
+0.4 +O.l +0.7 +0.7 +2.0 
Policy option component 
(Tax changes)$ 
(Distributional changes) 
(Increase in u) 
(OtherS 
-2.9 +0.7 -2.8 +4.5 -0.5 
+2.7 -2.6 +l.O -2.7 -1.6 
-0.1 Al.3 +O.l -0.5 -0.8 
+O.O -0.0 +o.o 20.0 +o.o 
-5.6 +3.6 -3.9 +7.7 +I.9 
* Figures may not sum up to totals because of rounding 
t PSBR stands for the investment-saving gap of the public sector relative to potential output. 
$ Increased tax effort produces a negative sign. 
5 Impact of changing spending, tax and transfer patterns. The relatively large figure for 1988-92 is mainly due to rising cur- 
rent spending and erosion of PE surpluses. 
Source: Boratav, Tiirel and Yeldan (1994), p. 9. 
of Ponzi financing. The policy option components 
which accounted for many of the changes in succes- 
sive subperiods seem to offset each other, leaving 
interest and debt shock as the major determining fac- 
tors of increased public deficits. 
Policy makers’ response to increased public deficits 
was an unwillingness to reduce transfer spending and 
undertake serious tax reform. There is a -2.4 percent- 
age point tax effort component behind the modest -0.5 
percentage point policy contribution to PSBR growth. 
But, as will be discussed below, this basically consists 
of (i) increased productivity of indirect taxation and 
(ii) the upward movement in wages and salaries during 
the last subperiod and the resulting increase in income 
tax revenue. No effort at reforming direct taxation 
took place. This led to a vicious circle of deficit 
finance via borrowing as the preferred alternative to 
meet expenditure gaps with all the adverse conse- 
quences. 
The indirect taxation regime had important conse- 
quences for environmental policy making. It can be 
argued that in the absence of a comprehensive, direct 
regulatory system, price policy remains the only 
instrument to address environmental concerns. The 
rise in the cost of energy which increased by almost 
50% faster than the industrial producer price in Turkey 
over the last decade is worth noting in this context. 
Thus, it can be argued that energy pricing policy suc- 
cessfully reflected the scarcity value of resources to 
the industrial producers. It could also be cited among 
the so-called “win-win” policies of the World Bank in 
which policies for “efficient” income growth comple- 
ment those for environmental protection (World Bank, 
1992). The technological input choice aspect of this 
policy has nevertheless yielded a rising trend in energy 
consumption both in terms of per unit of output and 
per labor employed in the manufacturing industry. 
despite the rising energy costs and a steep drop in real 
wages paid in the sector. On the other hand, polluter 
and/or user charges throughout the post-1980 period 
were neither sufficiently high nor strictly enforced to 
have a significant impact on the protection of environ- 
ment. 
(c) The state and the bourgeoisie: Corruption and 
rent-seeking under a “liberal” regime 
If we label as “rent-creating activities” all cases of 
economic decision making and policy implementation 
which create positions of advantage for individual 
businesses, as the economic regime moved further into 
liberalization, a broader the scope of rent-creation and 
rent-realization appears in post-1980 Turkey. This 
striking paradox created an embarrassing challenge to 
partisans of orthodoxy who had been advocating liber- 
alization on the basis of its favorable distributional 
consequences by lowering rents of all sorts emanating 
from a large, protective, interventionist state. 
The problem with the utopian neoliberal position is 
that under the structural and class characteristics of 
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less-developed capitalism, there are objective limits to 
the shrinking of the state and the very process of liber- 
alization creates new rents. In this context it should be 
noted that in most Third World countries the bour- 
geoisie itself is a creation of the state and this histori- 
cal phenomenon has created cultural, sociological and 
economic traits which do not disappear with changes 
in the policy model. The very process of rent-seeking 
emanates from the bourgeoisie, not from the state per 
se and this is a well-known daily fact in the Turkish 
scene which only academic liberals ignore. The major 
areas of rent-seeking and rent-creation under the lib- 
eral model have been (i) illicit appropriation of export 
subsidies through fictitious exports, (ii) speculative 
urban and touristic rents, (iii) privatization and stock 
exchange operations, (iv) government enders, (v) fis- 
cal incentives and bailing out of firms and banks in 
distress. These are reviewed in some detail in Boratav, 
Ttirel and Yeldan (1994). Although it is difficult to 
quantify, indirect evidence suggests that the relevant 
magnitudes (i.e. the rents or “spoils”) involved during 
the “liberal” phase may have been substantially larger 
than those under the ‘*protectionist/interventionist” 
phase. The mere fact that there has not been any period 
in the history of republican Turkey when corruption 
and economic scandals have so heavily dominated the 
public scene as the present one is significant in this 
context. Far from being transitional phenomena, rent- 
creating categories either persist or, as old patterns die 
out, new ones emerge. 
There was, moreover, another new element even in 
the process of rent-creation under the liberal regime: 
Decision making and implementation on rent-allocat- 
ing activities definitely shifted into the prerogative of 
the political layer of the state structure as the upper 
bureaucracy was pushed increasingly into a passive 
position. This was a conscious policy move and was 
carried out under the banner of “less government by 
eliminating the bureaucratic fetters in economic deci- 
sion-making.” During the import-substituting phase, 
the basic function of the bureaucratic layer has been 
not the elimination of “rents,” but rather guaranteeing 
neutral and/or acceptable conditions among rivaling 
claims with respect to the distribution of rents. 
Although this state of things was never fully satisfac- 
tory for the political “class” and their constituencies 
within the business community, it was nonetheless 
instrumental in creating a significant degree of stabil- 
ity. 
This modus vivendi which was gradually being 
undermined by uneasy coalition governments since 
the mid- 1970s was totally destroyed during the second 
half of the 1980s. A number of functions traditionally 
resting with the bureaucracy shifted to the political 
layer, e.g., directly to the Ministers or the Prime Min- 
ister. Key posts under the Ministry of Finance, SPO 
and the Central Bank, which had always been kept out 
of the reach of “outsiders” were now given to experts 
“imported” from abroad with no experience in Turkish 
public administration and who acted merely as exten- 
sions of the political “class.” The traditional bureau- 
cratic layer was gradually rendered ineffectual. More- 
over, the gradual erosion of the real salaries of the 
upper bureaucracy had a destructive impact on the 
quality of public administration. The eventual paraly- 
sis of the bureaucracy resulted in arbitrariness in rent 
creation and realization: Personal connections of busi- 
nessmen with ministers gradually became the deter- 
mining factor in access to the “spoils” emanating from 
the government. 
These new developments led to acute tensions and 
inner conflicts within the bourgeoisie as well as 
between certain business groups and the state particu- 
larly after the 1985-87 economic boom came to an 
end. Since all segments of the business community 
could not have equal access to the highest echelons of 
the political layer, it was natural that these orienta- 
tions, in the end, created more adversaries than sup- 
porters and led to the emergence of a strong sense of 
uncertainty and dissatisfaction within the bourgeoisie 
at large during the late 1980s. 
2. WORKINGS OF THE ECONOMY 
(a) Accumulation patterns 
Index numbers of public, private and total gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) are presented in Table 
5, taking 1977 as the reference year. The following 
points can be emphasized: 
- In constant (1987) prices, the overall 1977 
GFCF level was reached in 1986 and by 1992 
exceeded the former magnitude by 30%. Due to 
GDP growth, this results in declining IGDP ratios 
(calculated at 1987 prices) during 24.5% to 16.8% 
during 1977-92. For the public sector, 1992 fig- 
ures are around the 1977 levels. Private GFCF 
reached the 1977 level also in 1986 (1989 if we 
exclude housing investments). Annual growth 
rates for total and private investments were slightly 
lower than 1.8% and 3.5% p.a. for the 15-yearper- 
lod beginning in 1977. 
-There were two upward spurts in private invest- 
ments: The first was due to the boom in housing 
investments which attained a 36% p.a. growth rate 
1985-88 and the second in was a one-year “explo- 
sion” in real manufacturing GFCF by 64% in 1990. 
The level attained in 1990 was preserved during 
the following two years. It is very difficult to 
explain the second spurt with reference to conven- 
tional arguments (e.g., interest and inflation rates, 
crowding-in or crowding-out, acceleration factors, 
etc.) and this raises doubts about data reliability. 
- In terms of sectoral distribution, despite the 
1990 boom in private manufacturing investments, 
dramatic declines in public GFCF pushed real total 
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Table 5. Index numbers (1977=100) of GFCF by sectors 
(1977: loo) 
1981 1984 1989 1992 
GFCF, 95.2 87.5 89.4 101.4 
A+M+M 105.2 69.9 38.6 40.3 
Infrastructure 92.0 103.9 126.4 122.6 
Services 75.6 91.6 130.3 215.5 
GFCF, 62.7 83.0 143.5 166.9 
A+M+M 55. I 76.8 74.9 117.6 
Infrastructure 75.0 104.4 114.2 188.5 
Services 68.7 83.0 257.0 230.3 
GFCF, 78.9 85.5 113.4 130.4 
A+M+M 80.9 73.3 56.4 77.8 
Infrastructure 88.3 103.8 123.6 123.6 
Services 71.1 86.2 212.2 225.3 
* Subscripts g, p and t refer to “public”, “private” and “total.” 
Rows below GFCF, and GFCF,, are public and private sec- 
tom1 GFCF figures. A+M+M: agriculture + mining + manu- 
facturing; Infrastructure: energy + transport and communica- 
tions: Services: all other sectors. 
manufacturing GFCF 20% below its 1977 level. 
Indeed, in 1992 total real GFCF was below the 
1977 level in agriculture, mining, manufacturing 
and energy sectors. It is, in our view, this dramatic 
shift against the “productive” sectors that lies 
behind the decline in potential growth rate. 
- Crowding-out theses of private by public 
investments are not validated in the Turkish case 
by econometric analysis. Financial crowding-out is 
irrelevant in this controversy because it refers not 
to public investment per se, but rather to public 
deficits covered by borrowing whatever the under- 
lying cause. Our own data suggest tradeoffs 
between private investments in housing versus 
manufacturing, rather than the public/private 
dichotomy.4 
Declining rates in (and drastic changes in the sec- 
toral distribution of) capital formation was not accom- 
panied by higher efficiency of investments. The 
changing path of capital formation with no discernible 
improvement in output/capital ratios5 merely resulted 
in lower potential growth and a shift toward relative 
stagnation. Economists who share the foregoing diag- 
nosis are in agreement that a more active state is 
required for moving into a dynamic path of develop- 
ment. 
(b) The pattern ofprice movements 
(i) The wage cycle 
A grassroots workers’ movement starting in 1988 
combined with the catastrophic electoral setback of 
1989 for the ruling MP changed the industrial-social 
scene altogether. Elements of conventional populism 
have reemerged within, however, an essentially differ- 
ent overall environment: Turkey, unlike the 197Os, is 
now a major exporter of industrial products and, as 
will be discussed below is critically vulnerable to 
wage movements. The economy is facing a serious fis- 
cal constraint which is also highly sensitive to upward 
changes in public sector wages and salaries. 
Table 6 provides a picture of the wage cycle of 15 
years. By 1990 the preceding peak (1977 or 1978) for 
real wages was attained, but the W/Y ratio was sub- 
stantially behind the all-time peak due to productivity 
improvements which took place during the period. 
The magnitude of the wage explosion of 1989 and 
1990 can be observed by the 1990/1988 ratio for real 
wages: 72% or 51% increases in real wages in the PE 
sector and in manufacturing industry respectively in 
two years can only be characterized as an internal 
shock to the economy. Turkish experience is striking 
both in terms of the length and magnitude of the wage 
erosion and of the speed and magnitude of the “correc- 
tion.” As the relationship between competitiveness 
and wages further on shows, the Turkish case also 
provides a lesson on the futility of relying on wage 
compression alone as a medium-term policy variable 
for achieving competitiveness. Public sector wage 
increases were significantly higher than those of the 
private sector which tried to defend its profits by 
layoffs, part-time schemes, subcontracting, fictitious 
dissolution and reestablishment of companies. 
19900988 real wage ratios for public and private 
manufacturing industry were 1.76 and I .42, respec- 
tively. The outcome was further deterioration offinan- 
cial indicators for PEs after 1988 which facilitated the 
arguments of the pro-privatization lobby. 
Turkish data on manufacturing industry also enable 
us to look into the determinants of the wage share. 
Apart from the simple relation between productivity 
and real wages, another way of looking into the prob- 
lem is through an investigation of the determinants of 
mark-up rates: Under assumptions of mark-up pricing, 
wages I value-added ratios are, by definition. deter- 
mined by the mark-up rate, and the ratio in v&e terms 
between nonlabor input costs (C’) and wages (W). 
Within such a framework, the factors which will affect 
W/Y downward are: increased mark-up rates. 
increased capital intensity of production under 
unchanging relative prices (constant real wages in 
terms of nonlabor input costs), and a decline in real 
wages (in terms of input costs), that is relative 
increases in intermediate costs (in terms of labor 
costs). 
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Table 6. Index numbers of real wages and wages/value-added 
(W/u) ratios, selected years* 
Years W, W,, WJY, WdYv r(%o) CIW 
1976 100.0 100.0 34.3 29.8 .358 5.601 
1977 113.2 108.3 37.1 35.1 .305 5.065 
1980 96.9 81.9 30.7 27.6 .359 6.318 
1983 85.1 80.1 24.8 26.0 .316 8.015 
1986 70.0 68.0 16.1 18.2 .381 10.832 
1987 74.9 76.6 17.3 17.4 ,382 11.404 
1988 74.0 74.6 15.4 16.7 .398 11.577 
1989 103.7 90.1 19.0 19.7 ,363 10.246 
1990 127.1 112.8 21.7 21.8 .408 7.815 
TIP .556 .623 ,415 .476 
1988/P ,587 ,689 .415 ,476 
19900988 1.719 1.517 1.409 1.305 
1990/P 1.009 1.042 ,585 .612 
W,,: Real wages in PEs, Wmr: Real wages in total manufac- 
turing. T: All-time trough in real wages, P: Pre-1980s peak. r: 
Mark-up rates in private manufacturing. C/W: Nonlabor 
input costs relative to wage bill in private manufacturing. The 
deflator used in real wage calculations is based on wholesale 
price series of State Institute of Statistics (SIS) for 1981 
onward and of the Treasury for preceding years. WJY,,, and 
W,,JYmp refer to total and private manufacturing sector in cur- 
rent prices, respectively. 
The manufacturing industry data for 197690 sug- 
gest that the period covered can be divided into years 
when, first, stable mark-up rates + changing C/W 
ratios occurred, and second, when relatively substan- 
tial changes in (r) together with minor or significant 
changes in C/W ratios are observed. 1977, 1981, and 
1983-85 are years when r dropped significantly to a 
lower level to recover immediately afterward, some- 
times to a higher plateau. The other years represent, 
roughly speaking, the first case above. 
The data further suggest that productivity and real 
wage changes are the main determinants of variations 
in C/W ratios. Relative nonlabor input prices, chang- 
ing input coefficients and industrial coverage provide 
additional, but less important explanatory factors. 
During a period of radical change in relative prices 
such as 1976-90, mark-up rates have been strikingly 
stable. On the basis of available Turkish data, one can 
propose three possible determinants in explaining 
changing mark-up rates: rates of capacity utilization, 
rates of protection for the relevant industries and rates 
of change in real wages. 
The analysis in Boratav, Tiirel and Yeldan (1994) 
shows that until 1976, real wage growth rates seem to 
be more closely (and inversely) related with mark-up 
rates and capacity utilization rates seem to be another 
explanatory factor. The latter variable seems to affect 
(r) during 1974-77, the last years of the gowth cycle of 
the 1970s. During 1978-82, real wage declines seem 
to explain the rise in (r) since this is a period of very 
low rates of capacity utilization. 1983-85 seems to 
have been an exceptional phase since it incorporates a 
decline in (r) together with lower real wages and 
higher capacity use. This may be the only subperiod 
where import liberalization under a stagnant conjunc- 
ture may have affected the erosion of profit margins. 
Higher capacity use in 1986-88 and 1990 and real 
wage movements in opposite directions in 1988 and 
1989 seem to be the determining factors behind mark- 
up movements (continually rising rates from 1984 
except in 1989). The absence of any strong link 
between rates of protection and mark-up rates is strik- 
ing except, as we have noted, for 1983-85. There 
seems to be no solid empirical ground for linking the 
so-called rents of protection and the trade regime. We 
return to this question when we investigate sectoral 
relative price movements below. 
It should be clear that oligopolistic mark-up pricing 
has direct consequences for environment via the 
choice of input mix. For example, there is evidence 
that cost savings achieved from repressed wages and 
lagging material input prices (of the public enter- 
prises) served as a buffer against rising energy prices 
in the private manufacturing sector (Yeldan and 
Bakan, 1993). Consequently, in an oligopolistic envi- 
ronment private producers could exercise pricing 
strategies based on cost-plus-mark-ups and when 
prices of other factors of production lagged behind the 
price of energy, oligopolistic producer surpluses could 
be maintained, and the rise in energy prices did not 
necessarily result in substitution away from energy 
inputs. The pressure of this setting on the environment 
is potentially enormous, and is further compounded by 
the fact that the present technology in electricity pro- 
duction relies heavily on the use of low-grade coal.6 
We reflect more on this issue inspection 4(c) below. 
(ii) Agriculture’s terms of trade 
Table 7 produces the findings on Turkish and inter- 
national terms of trade for agriculture (TOTA, and 
TOTA,, respectively). It shows the dramatic regres- 
sion in 197688 and the substantial recovery in 
1989-90 in parallel with the “wage explosion” and as 
part of the overall process of the reemergence of pop- 
ulism. Table 8 provides hints on the role of the policy 
tools (i.e. the relative magnitude of support purchases 
and relative support prices) as a determinant of TOTA. 
Differential (i.e. flexible vs. mark-up) pricing behav- 
ior of agriculture and industry under specified macro 
policies and in response to productivity may provide 
an additional explanation of TOTA movements. On 
possible other determinants, differential income elas- 
ticities of demand and different income growth for the 
two sectors cannot provide an explanation of agricul- 
tural price movements of the 1980s in view of the real- 
ized growth of incomes and acceptable elasticity val- 
ues. 
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Table 7. Inlernal and inremational terms of trade for agri- 
culture: index numbers, ratios and rate of change (%J 
Years TOTA, TOTA, T/W G,(s) G,, 
1973 111.7 174.0 .642 - - 
1974 119.8 162.2 .739 +7.3 -6.8 
1975 116.9 143.0 ,817 -2.4 -11.8 
1976 100.0 100.0 1.000 -14.5 -30.1 
1977 99.5 89.5 1.112 a.5 -10.5 
1978 96.7 104.1 ,929 -2.8 +16.3 
1979 81.4 104.5 ,779 -15.8 +0.4 
1980 67.3 137.2 ,491 -17.3 +31.3 
1981 65.4 118.3 ,553 -2.8 -13.8 
1982 56.7 90.3 .628 -13.3 -23.7 
1983 59.2 99.3 ,596 +4.4 +lO.O 
1984 66.1 92.3 ,716 +11.7 -7.0 
1985 63.7 79.5 ,801 -3.6 -13.9 
1986 62.1 71.4 ,870 -2.5 -10.2 
1987 59.0 73.3 ,805 -5.0 +2.7 
1988 49.8 80.8 ,623 -15.6 +9.1 
1989 ’ 57.8 81.9 ,706 +16.1 i2.4 
1990 70.7 73.1 ,967 +22.3 -10.7 
1991 66.2 69.5 ,953 -6.4 -4.9 
Table 8. Relative magnitude of support purchases (9;) and 
relative support prices (ratios between index 
numbers) 
Years SP/A VA p/p 
1976 14.7 1.000 1.000 
1977-79 12.2 ,752 ,778 
1980-86 8.6 ,673 ,867 
1987 7.3 ,723 .856 
1988 5.5 ,797 1.029 
1989 5.7 ,826 ,944 
1990 7.6 1.240 1.785 
1991 12.0 1.143 I.268 
1992 13.2 1.166 1.167 
Notes: Calculations based on SPO and SIS data. SP: Value of 
support purchases by public agencies. AVA: Agricultural 
value-added. P, : Index number of weighed support prices for 
wheat, tobacco, sugar beet, cotton, sunflower seed, hazelnuts 
and tea (only the first three are considered for 199&91. and 
the first six for 1992). P: Wholesale price index. P, : Index 
number of implicit deflator for agriculture as calculated from 
GDP series. 
Notes: TOTA, for 1973-89 is from Ttirel(l99 1) and updated 
for 199&91 based on the ratio between UNCTAD’s price 
indices for agricultural and manufactured commodities in 
world trade. TOTA, is based on GDP implicit deflators. G, and 
G, are annual growth rates for TOTA, and TOTA,. 
As for the role of international terms of trade move- 
ments as a possible determinant of TOTA for Turkey, 
the question is important not only in its own right, but 
also for understanding the degree of freedom of 
domestic support policies vis-ci-vis world market para- 
meters. The overall impression one can get from Table 
7 is that there is not a high degree of dependence of 
TOTA, on TOTA,: Out of the 18 years covered in the 
table, the direction of change is the same (both + or- 
signs) in only 10 years. It seems however, that follow- 
ing the price shock of 1980 - a year where, paradox- 
ically, there was a significant improvement in 
TOTA,-, internal price movements seem to fall more 
in line with international terms of trade: Divergence in 
direction of change in TOTA, and TOTA, occurs in 
four out of seven years during 1973-80, but only four 
out of 11 in the post-1980 years. Fluctuations around 
the mean during the first phase were relatively speak- 
ing, significantly higher than those during the latter 
period. 
One can conclude that international price move- 
ments had some, and increasing, impact on local terms 
of trade; but it was not a dominant factor. By the end of 
the 198Os, the ratio between local and international 
terms of trade was still significantly below the parity 
of 1976, and although 1987-89 and 1973-75 averages 
were nearer each other, Turkish farmers were still 
losers compared with world exporters of agricultural 
commodities. It also turns out that if local terms of 
trade had followed international prices during 
1981-86, the relative price deterioration of Turkish 
farmers would have been significantly more serious. 
The adjustment pattern of farmers in response to 
relative price changes is another crucial theme for 
debates on support policies. It is clear that the deterio- 
ration of relative prices affected farmers’ investments 
adversely during the 1980s. By the end of the decade. 
private investments in agriculture in real terms were 
less than one-third of the level attained in 1976. Public 
investments made up some of the deficiency, but still 
the overall picture is, at best, one of stagnant capital 
accumulation in agriculture. This would be expected 
to have adverse consequences for labor productivity. 
It did not happen during 1976-88, the trough year in 
terms of TOTA, average labor productivity growth is 
1.3% p.a. - a rate which is, however, lower than that 
observed during the preceding 15 years. 
To make up for the adverse impact of investment 
stagnation on output, farmers increased the intensity 
of land use in certain areas, but extended cultivation 
into marginal areas and/or undertook deforestation 
practices. Thus, as a percentage of the total cropland, 
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Table 9. Sectoral tenm of trade movements and the trade regime: index numbers, 1976=100 and shares/rates in percentage 
Years 1979 1980 1983 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Ind. 
Agr. 
Serv. 
Const. 
Trade 
T&C 
Finance 
Housing 
Lib. Pr. 
Gov’t 
E, 
(X+M)IY 
(X+M)JY 
NP 
111.1 
90.5 
104.6 
130.8 
93.7 
102.4 
88.0 
195.4 
100.6 
101.0 
83.8 
9.3 
11.1 
- 
116.7 123.6 138.5 
78.5 73.1 68.9 
110.3 109.2 104.9 
116.0 119.8 153.0 
112.9 115.1 108.0 
108.2 121.7 114.9 
76.9 96.0 151.0 
125.0 124.5 85.6 
95.7 98.6 82.8 
82.8 61.5 58.5 
111.7 153.6 169.7 
15.5 24.3 27.8 
13.9 15.8 16.4 
129.0 119.0 59.0 
131.2 
75.9 
104.3 
134.6 
109.5 
111.5 
133.3 
69.4 
80.5 
81.8 
154.6 
24.9 
16.1 
- 
118.1 117.9 
83.4 80.0 
105.5 107.6 
136.7 147.4 
101.9 100.4 
109.8 110.8 
160.9 202.1 
64.8 72.9 
80.0 79.7 
106.8 117.0 
134.4 143.5 
23.3 23.2 
17.3 16.2 
28.7 28.3 
* The first 10 rows are index numbers of sectoral relative prices from GDP series. (Each sectoral price index is related to the 
GDP’s implicit deflator.) Rows 4-10 are subsectors of the service sector. The last four rows are effective real exchange rate 
(TL per dollar, index number), trade/GNP shares in nominal terms, in terms of REER and weighted average of nominal tariff 
rates (in percentages) respectively. For Er see Table 2. NP, taken from Krueger and Aktan (1992) is an unweighted average 
rate of protection except for the 1990-91 figures which are weighted averages taken from Togan (n.d.). Research assistance 
by N. Solakoglu is acknowledged. 
the share of irrigated land increased only marginally 
from 7% to 9% over 1980-89. With shortened periods 
of fallow, the nutrient capacity of arable soil declined 
and together with forest clearing, exacerbated the 
extent of soil erosion.’ 
Complicating these problems further was the fact 
that more intensive agricultural practices resulted in 
the declining immunity of many crops to pest attacks. 
A typical response to such threats was to increase pes- 
ticide dosages or the frequency of spraying. This 
would offer temporary relief but in the meantime 
would only hasten the trend of pesticide resistance. In 
the process, farmers have become trapped on what the 
RFF (1994) refers as “the pesticide treadmill,” cycle of 
ever-growing dependence on chemicals that offers 
diminishing returns with consequent increased water 
pollution, while necessitating higher cash expendi- 
tures. 
(iii) Sectoral relative prices and surplus redistribution 
protection (NP) and external trade/GNP ratios 
(X+&f/y] are indicators presented in Table 9 represent- 
ing various aspects of the trade regime or the degree of 
“opening-up” of the national economy. On the basis of 
the foregoing changes on the trade regime and “open- 
ing-up,” incorporating significant import penetration 
as construed from Table 3, an orthodox neoclassical 
approach would expect relative prices between non- 
tradeable / tradeable sectors (roughly represented in 
our table by the relative sectoral price for “services”) 
and relative prices for industry and trade (incorporat- 
ing “rents of protection” and commercial margins, 
respectively) to decline significantly between the 
early and late 1980s. An improvement for relative 
prices in labor-intensive agriculture would then take 
place. 1988 can be set as a reference point by which all 
these predictions can be tested in view of the real 
depreciation by 5 1 %, a threefold increase in the share 
of the external trade from 1979 and a decline by 54% 
in nominal protection. 
Table 9 provides findings on sectoral terms of trade Table 9 shows that orthodox predictions did not 
movements. The critical issue to be discussed is the take place. The predominantly nontradeable service 
following: Is the trade regime a crucial determinant of sector’s terms of trade improved by 5% during 
sectoral prices and, hence, of income distribution? Or, 1976-79 and remained stable thereafter. Industrial and 
alternatively, do internal and autonomous changes in agricultural relative prices moved in opposite direc- 
income distribution affect sectoral relative prices with tions, with an improvement in the former and a deteri- 
the trade regime playing a secondary role, if any? oration in the latter. Trade margins register a signifi- 
Real exchange rate (E,) movements, the degree of cant widening, particularly during 1979-88. 
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Table 10. Indicators on the redistribution ofthe surplus* 
Years 
1976 
1977 
1979 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
RIP,, 
52.6 
54.1 
60.4 
67.6 
50.1 
56.3 
49.9 
48.2 
69.5 
RIP, 
13.4 
22.1 
53.7 
42.0 
46.0 
39.0 
45.2 
41.5 
42.2 
47.3 
63.3 
- 
Fin/GDP TrIGDP 
2.2 15.3 
1.9 15.4 
2.1 15.3 
2.0 16.5 
2.3 18.3 
2.2 19.2 
2.2 19.0 
2.4 17.9 
3.0 20.3 
3.3 20.3 
2.8 19.7 
3.2 19.5 
4.2 18.9 
4.3 19.1 
R/GDP R(r) 
2.0 100 
6.8 393 
7.9 488 
8.5 579 
8.8 677 
8.2 695 
9.8 857 
10.3 929 
8.7 859 
P(br) 
IO0 
247 
329 
637 
618 
969 
1310 
I007 
1525 
* For symbols and concepts, see text. The first three columns are percentages, the last two columns are index numbers. RIP,,,, 
and RIP, refer to 500 largest firms in Turkey and to industry in Eskisehir region. respectively. The table is an updated and 
adapted (to new GDP series) version of Boratav (1991, Table 1). R/GDP and R(r) are estimated anew on the basis of Temel’s 
(1991) findings to which public sector interest payments are added. 
We have already analyzed industry / agriculture 
price relations and therefore only discuss the factors 
which may have led relative prices for the service sec- 
tor to violate neoclassical expectations. A very simple 
answer could be that the components (subsectors) of 
the heterogenous service sector incorporate different 
internal distributional dynamics, each of which have 
affected pricing behavior in a discordant fashion. The 
composite relative price for the service sector is, there- 
fore, the outcome of what has happened within each of 
its components. Internal distributional dynamics 
emerge as the basic determinant in this respect, 
whereas the trade regime may act essentially as an 
indirect one.* 
Sectoral terms of trade movements illuminate an 
important aspect of secondary relations of distribu- 
tion: Relative price movements of trade and finance 
vs. industry may provide some evidence with respect 
to the internal division of the surplus. Here, we inves- 
tigate this aspect of the redistribution of the surplus 
between financial, commercial and industrial capital 
and rentiers more directly. The indicators used are the 
share of interest costs in industrial gross profits (RIP), 
the share of finance and trade in GDP (Fin./GDP & 
Tr./GDP respectively), the share of interest revenues 
in GDP (R/GDP), interest income in constant prices 
[R(r)], and (v) profits of the banking sector in constant 
prices [P(br)]. The relevant findings are presented in 
Table 10. 
The first two columns of the table show that with 
respect to the internal division of the surplus, a dra- 
matic progression of interest burden took place at the 
cost of industrial profits during the 1980s. Financial 
capital and rentiers shared the benefits of “financial 
liberalization.” It should be noted that R/GDP and R(r) 
figures underestimate the size of interest revenue since 
they cover only those from time deposits, foreign 
exchange deposits, government bonds and Treasury 
bills but exclude interest revenues from investment 
funds managed by other financial institutions and 
from the new financial instruments of recent years. 
Following the arguments in Akytiz ( 1991) and on 
the basis of casual observations, we can hypothesize 
that the typical nouveau n’che whose revenues are 
mainly of speculative character and based essentially 
on the ownership of financial assets and/or real estate 
have a low propensity to invest, exhibit extreme 
versions of conspicuous consumption and have 
both the capacity and inclination to switch resources 
abroad should appropriate conditions emerge. Their 
increased domination of the economic scene has seri- 
ous, unpredictable and most possibly adverse conse- 
quences. The perception of their separate identity is 
important because it will be primarily this group that is 
targeted for any serious fiscal reform during the com- 
ing years. 
(c) Destabilizing processes: thefiscal andpnancial 
systems 
(i) Fiscal strains 
The findings in Section 1 may suggest that Turkish 
fiscal deficits were not as serious as that experienced 
by a number of developing countries during most of 
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the 1980s. On the other hand, after the financial col- 
lapse of 1982 financial liberalization continued at a 
relatively smooth pace and by the early 1990s had 
attained an advanced level both internally and exter- 
nally. Despite these satisfactory appearances, the 
interrelationship between the fiscal and financial sys- 
tems had started to create a number of tensions which, 
by the early 1990s. were leading to serious destabiliz- 
ing processes. 
The following points concerning the changing 
structure of the fiscal system and the factors leading to 
fiscal strain are worth emphasizing: 
- On the revenue side, it is not the changes in the 
overall tax burden, but rather those in its structure 
which have been the characteristic feature of the 
period covered. Although agricultural incomes 
were not satisfactorily taxed and payroll taxes con- 
tinued to be the most productive component, 
Turkey until 1984 was gradually moving toward a 
unified and progressive pattern of direct taxation 
with a direct to total tax ratio of around 57% in 
1981. Tax reform in the 1980s reversed these 
developments. The income tax became drastically 
less progressive and more fragmented; dividends, 
interest income on bonds and government bills, 
realized capital gains on real estate and financial 
assets were excepted from taxation. Rental and 
intellectual property incomes and interest revenue 
on bank deposits were taxed at low and flat rates. 
Although the corporate tax rate was raised, effec- 
tive rates were reduced by a variety of exceptions 
and incentive schemes. On the other hand, the 
introduction of value-added tax (VAT) increased 
productivity of indirect taxation, contributing to a 
17 percentage point decline in the direct to total tax 
ratio during 198 l-92. 
- On the expenditure side, interest payments on 
domestic debt soared by about four percentage 
points of GDP during 1979-92, due to ‘financial 
deepening” under high inflation. Public current 
spending was in a trough in 1988 mainly due to 
erosion of salaries, but upward adjustment of 
salaries and increased resource flow into military / 
security services pushed it upward again, bringing 
it to 12.2% of GDP, approximately two percentage 
points higher than that of the 1979. 
- Stagnation in tax revenues and increased trans- 
fer and current spending brought pressures for a 
downward adjustment of public investments. In 
relative terms, public investments were nearly 
halved during I98 l-92 with a heavy incidence on 
productive sectors. Adjustment in Z, was not suffi- 
cient however for improving overall balance. Both 
Zp-S, and PSBR to GDP ratios rose considerably 
after 1988 reaching 7.2% and 10.4% respectively, 
in 1991.’ On corrective actions, the government 
opted for palliatives during 1988-92; e.g., 
increased rates of monetization, further downward 
pressures on Ip and stepping up the privatization 
campaign. 
(ii) Towardfinancial misadventures? 
There is no doubt that in terms of conventional cri- 
teria “financial deepening” has taken place (Cinder and 
Tiirel, 1993, Table 25). The question is not whether 
such a process has actually taken place, but rather 
whether it has resulted in increased efficiency of the 
financial system. 
By the early 1990s the multiplication and diversifi- 
cation of new financial assets and instruments had 
taken a chaotic form: two-thirds of all new issues were 
being realized by the banking sector, the rest within the 
capital market. To overcome the increased cost of 
holding deposits, banks started to devise a number of 
new instruments exempt from compulsory liquidity 
requirements on deposits. What resulted was the emer- 
gence of a number of financial instruments offering 
(under inflation rates around 60%) positive real interest 
rates for almost perfectly liquid holdings (Yeldan, 
forthcoming; Sak and Yeldan, 1993). These may be 
interpreted as flexible methods for overcoming the 
constraints imposed on banks by the Central Govem- 
ment. An important by-product was, however, 
increased resource flow into idle financial assets by 
firms. A breakdown of the aggregated balance sheet of 
the 500 largest industrial firms shows that the share of 
nonindustrial revenues in total revenues averaged 
45.0% in 1991-92 in contrast to 17.5% in 1982-83.1° 
Most of the former consisted of short-term returns on 
risk-free financial instruments and represent he unnat- 
ural situation of firms increasingly acting as rentiers. 
As will be elaborated below in the discussion on the 
role of banks with respect to hot money movements, 
even banks have started to act increasingly as institu- 
tional rentiers. The share of gross bank revenues or 
profits from capital market and forex operations and 
from government bond holdings can be used as an 
indicator of the phenomenon. During the first half of 
1993, gross revenues and profits from these three 
sources constituted 47.6% and 42.3% of the total.” 
The share of credit in the total assets of the banking 
system declined from 51.3% in 1980 to 36.5% in 
1992. 
On discussing the efficiency impact of financial lib- 
eralization, a distinction between allocational and 
technical efficiency will be useful. A narrowing of rate 
of return differentials between firms and industries 
would indicate an improvement in allocational effi- 
ciency. Another indication of improvement would be a 
reduction in the rates of nonperforming credits, loan 
defaults and bankruptcies of financial institutions. 
During the 1980s the reallocation of credits of the 
banking system away from agriculture and industry 
toward construction, housing, transport, tourism and 
domestic trade does not signify a move in response to 
differentials in social rates of returns between sectors. 
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Within industrial subsectors, data for the private sector 
in the 500 largest industrial firms that coefficients of 
variation of profitability did not decline during 
1982-91 (ijnder and Ttlrel, 1993). With respect to the 
latter indicator, although data coming from banks are 
unreliable, there is no doubt that financial liberaliza- 
tion was accompanied by higher rates of loan default 
Cases of bankruptcies or government-enforced merg- 
ers to prevent failures were common during the whole 
period. 
Two indicators for measuring the technical effi- 
ciency of the financial system are proposed: costs of 
intermediation and real costs to the borrower. Figures 
on net spread in Akkurt et al. (1991) show that there 
had not been a permanent improvement in either. 1982 
was an exceptionally chaotic year, yet it registered the 
largest net financial margins. During the relatively 
controlled period of 1983-87, the average net spread 
is 8.3 percentage points. The three years following the 
deregulation of interest rates in 1988, witnessed a sig- 
nificant widening of the spread. A more detailed 
breakdown of the components of the net spread shows 
that it is not labor costs, but rather the upward move- 
ment in management costs and net profits of the bank- 
ing system which have contributed to the phenome- 
non. This is, in our view, persuasive evidence that 
Turkish financial liberalization did not correspond to a 
move toward a more competitive environment, but 
rather vice versa. 
Finally, let us note some implications of external 
financial liberalization. Rentiers, firms and banks are 
the agents behind hot money movements which have 
dominated the capital account of balance of payments 
and external debt growth from the late 1980s onward. 
Rentiers shift between FX and TL assets and engage in 
currency switching, capital flight and its return. Firms 
shift between borrowing in TL or FX locally and/or 
abroad. Banks - under current conditions - borrow 
abroad and lend domestically. The relevant rates of 
return affecting these agents is discussed in Boratav 
(1993). Except for 1989, the direction of short-term 
capital movements in response to interest rates and 
nominal exchange rate changes conform to the 
expected behavioral pattern. 
The magnitude of unrecorded capital movements 
can be estimated by calculating the divergence 
between external debt growth and the cumulative cur- 
rent account deficits after correcting for reserve move- 
ments, errors and omissions, changes in cross 
exchange rates and misinvoicing of exports and 
imports. A study” on hot money movements, esti- 
mates that (after all aforementioned corrections) dur- 
ing 1989-91, $3.3 billions of unrecorded capital out- 
flow had taken place. There are difficulties with the 
underlying economic mechanisms, but there is no 
doubt that a liberalized regime of capital movements 
and erratic interest/exchange rate movements have 
been building an important element of instability into 
the external balances of the economy. 
This is an extremely unpredictable environment. 
The 1989-92 experience shows the serious problems 
confronting a developing economy which decides to 
move into full external and internal deregulation in the 
financial system under conditions of high inflation: 
“The spectre of capital flight” becomes the dominant 
motive in policy making and creates commitments to 
high interest rates and overvaluation. The links of 
these two policy variables with the real economy, i.e. 
investment rates and the current account of the balance 
of payments, are severed. High credit costs not only 
discourage fixed investment, but also lead to a pattern 
of factor use which runs counter to environmental pro- 
tection objectives. When adverse impacts particularly 
on the current balance become too destabilizing, real 
depreciation comes on the agenda which, however, 
needs to be matched by further upward adjustment in 
the rate of interest if currency switching or capital 
flight is to be restrained. Instability in exchange and 
interest rates creates feedbacks which lead the econ- 
omy further into instability. 
The rational solution is to reimpose controls on cap- 
ital movements. There are, however, strong elements 
of irreversibility when a liberalized financial system is 
concerned. Some degree of control on short-term bor- 
rowing abroad of banks, firms and public agencies can 
be reestablished, but rentiers are less likely to be con- 
strained and it may very well be their collective behav- 
ior which carries the gravest risks of financial misad- 
ventures. 
(d) Trade issues 
An exercise at decomposing the factors behind the 
impressive Turkish export performance concludes 
that regional composition and product mix effects 
were either negative or negligible throughout except 
for 1981-82 when the regional factor prevailed mainly 
by successful penetration into Middle East markets.” 
The residual component, as high as 80%, turns out to 
be the major factor behind the Turkish export perfor- 
mance. 
It is this residue which reflects changes in the com- 
petitiveness of Turkish export sectors. Considering the 
fact that export growth of the 1980s was based pre- 
dominantly on industrial goods which now constitute 
roughly 80% of commodity exports, one should look 
into changes in the degree of competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector in analyzing the export perfor- 
mance of the Turkish economy. It is comprised, essen- 
tially, of movements in (i) the real exchange rate 
(including subsidy components) for industrial exports, 
(ii) real wages and (iii) labor productivity. 
Table 11 shows the improvement in industrial com- 
petitiveness (IC) during 1980-88 which was, essen- 
tially, due to real devaluation and wage repression. 
Tbe productivity improvement starting from the 
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Table 11. Index numbers of competitiveness of industrial exports and its determinants (1976=100)* 
REER 
(1) 
Real 
Wages 
(2) 
Hourly 
Wages ($) 
(3) 
Industrial Competitiveness 
Productivity Indicator 
(4) [(4)/(3)*1001 
1977 98.2 108.3 119.9 97.5 81.3 
1980 111.7 81.9 111.1 69.4 63.0 
1983 153.6 80.1 85.4 87.5 102.5 
1986 168.0 68.0 70.3 115.9 164.9 
1987 162.8 76.6 77.0 120.0 155.8 
1988 169.7 74.6 74.9 130.1 173.7 
1989 154.6 90.1 100.5 123.8 123.2 
1990 134.4 112.8 161.6 141.6 87.6 
* For REER see Table 2, Column 4 is labor productivity. The other columns are from Boratav, Ttirel and Yeldan (1994). 
trough of 1980 takes place in an apparently 
respectable annual rate of 8.2%. It should be noted, 
however, that the peak to peak rate of growth in indus- 
trial productivity during 1977-90 was merely 2.5% 
p.a. and this performance was a relative to other newly 
industrializing countries (NICs), a dismal one? Com- 
paring late 1970s with late 198Os, annual growth of 
labor productivity in Spanish and Korean manufactur- 
ing industries was 5.5% and 7.4% respectively. 
Despite this inferior productivity performance, Turk- 
ish IC improved dramatically in comparison with the 
two countries. This improvement was based totally on 
wage and exchange rate movements. It is ironical, 
however, that all the positive factors behind the 
improvement in Turkish IC were reversed in 1989 and 
1990. In a sense, the painful operation of adjustment 
realized during the past decade toward export orienta- 
tion was eliminated within two years. 
It should also be noted that the Turkish export 
expansion might also have had harmful environmental 
consequences, since almost three-fourths of Turkish 
manufactured exports originate from sectors such as 
food, textiles and apparel and metallurgy, character- 
ized either by sizable inputs from a hard-pressed agri- 
culture sector or by high levels of pollutant emissions. 
On policy options, productivity improvements are 
crucially dependent on the level and composition of 
GFCF and, despite some positive signs in recent years, 
this has been one of the weak spots of the 1980s. Sys- 
tematic wage repression is no longer on the agenda 
and the best one can expect on that front is a social pact 
which aligns wages to productivity movements. 
On exchange rate policies, industrial exporters 
which are committed to opening up their financial sys- 
tems are doomed to real appreciation of their curren- 
cies which effectively and quickly erodes their com- 
petitive power. When a certain level as an industrial 
exporter is attained, the proindustrial lobby is dis- 
cemed by a commitment at least to a PPP-based 
exchange rate policy, if not to real depreciations so as 
to preserve or improve the competitiveness of the 
industrial sector. But exchange and interest rate poli- 
cies with a view to inducing short-term capital inflows 
jointly create adverse impacts on the real side of the 
economy: declines in IC and GFCF are inevitable. 
Lower GFCF undermines IC further by its adverse 
impact on productivity movements. Under these cir- 
cumstances, countries such as India, that can still pur- 
sue exchange rate policies based on current account 
targets are better placed than countries such as Turkey 
that have opted for the luxury of liberalizing their cap- 
ital movements. 
3. THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 
(a) Statement of the problem 
A fully-fledged macro model of environment-econ- 
omy interrelationships for Turkey necessitates the 
elaboration and the quantification of the following 
links: depletion rates of resources and its relation to 
output, “production” of waste and its impact on envi- 
ronmental quality via pollution stocks, resource build- 
up through capital investment, removal of pollution 
via clean-up expenditure, and welfare effects of 
resource and pollution stocks (see Pezzey, 1992, p. 7). 
Although technical coefficients in the first four links 
are estimable in principle, it is hard to establish quan- 
titative relations between the loss of environmental 
quality (itself a function of pollution stocks together 
with natural resource stocks) and the ensuing output 
loss on the one hand, and conversion of waste flows 
into pollution stocks on the other. The final link is a 
virtually unexplored area in terms of applied research 
in Turkey. 
Hence, we choose to explore the interaction 
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between the environment and the economy, alongside 
with the third (and technically, the best known) link 
with an emphasis on policy issues for a specific pollu- 
tant category: We implement an archetype com- 
putable general equilibrium (CGE) model with rudi- 
mentary data from OECD sources to study incidences 
of industrial energy consumption on gaseous pollu- 
tion. Our conceptualization is based on the empirical 
regularities between industrial growth and emissions 
of gaseous pollutants-especially of CO, gases. With 
respect to emissions of greenhouse gases, Turkey dis- 
plays typical middle-income country characteristics: 
with a per capita CO, emission of 2.3 tons, it ranks 
below the world average of 4.2 tons. Yet, in compari- 
son along a CO, emissions per $ GDP scale, with its 
2.2 kg/$, it fares unfavorably against many OECD 
countries, where the average lies around 0.8 kg/$. 
Studies further show that Turkey ranks among those 
countries where industrial use of commercial energy 
has risen the fastest during the last decade; and it is 
cited among the top 25 countries with the highest 
industrial emissions of CO, in 1991 (RFF, 1994, Table 
11.8). 
Although the energy and other factor prices in post- 
1980 Turkey could be said to “correctly” reflect rela- 
tive scarcities of inputs, technological input choices 
concerning energy use did not respond to this relative 
price configuration at all. It was argued in section 2 (b) 
above that, in addition to the technological constraints. 
oligopolistic behavior may serve as a significant 
explanatory factor in the observed upward trend of 
industrial emissions of gaseous pollutants in Turkey. 
Under such a setting, industrialists command market 
power which, by shifting the burden of taxation on 
final consumers, can negate theoretically sound envi- 
ronmental policies based on market incentives. 
Thus we suggest the working hypothesis that, as an 
indirect instrument of pollution control, the market 
mechanism will likely to have limited effects at best, 
given the Turkish socieconomic reality. Under such 
circumstances, we conceptualize the use of direct 
quantitative restrictions emission by setting explicit 
targets. We utilize the CGE model both to solve for the 
necessary tax rate to sustain the target emission level, 
and also to study the general equilibrium effects of this 
policy maneuver. We aim at investigating the conceiv- 
able effects of feasible environmental policies through 
a series of “what if’ scenarios using the general equi- 
librium model on a discrete time path, 1987-2000. To 
this end we first present the model’s distinguishing 
specifications. 
(b) The CGE model specification 
The model used in our environmental policy simu- 
lations is a discrete-dynamic CGE model with empha- 
sis on the real sectors. It is designed to capture the 
level of gaseous (CO, NO* SO,) emissions resulting 
from industrial activity, as well as the returns to envi- 
ronmental policy to limit such emissions. 
The model is based on five production sectors; three 
types of private households; (i.e. the rural class eam- 
ing agricultural value-added, industrial labor, services 
labor and two urban capitalist classes, industrial and 
commercial/Iinancial, capturing the sectoral (residual 
profits) and the government. A CES composite good 
formulation is adopted for import versus domestic 
consumption. Likewise, domestic export supply is 
determined via a transformation frontier with a con- 
stant elasticity between the domestic consumption and 
export. Private consumption demand follows fixed 
sectoral shares with the underlying assumption that 
agents have Cobb-Douglas preferences. Aggregate 
public consumption and investment are fixed exoge- 
nously. 
Two sources of environmental pollution are distin- 
guished: first, CO,, SO,, and NO, gases are emitted in 
constant proportions to aggregate industrial output. 
Second, CO, emissions are further recognized in 
energy use, as constant proportions of intermediate 
energy input. Admittedly, this approach imposes a 
very severe rigidity into the model, since restricting 
emissions amount to restricting industrial output sup- 
ply. Conceptually, as noted in Bergman (1991), emis- 
sions of pollutants can be regarded as a distinct factor 
of production with an imputed elasticity of substitu- 
tion between other factor services. The nature and fea- 
sibility of such environment-friendly, “green” tech- 
nologies, however, still constitute an unsettled issue 
and given the lack of sound evidence and supporting 
data, we chose to assume proportional emission rates 
in the model solutions. Furthermore, following 
Gunter, van Nieuwkoop and Wiedmer (1992), the 
level of aggregate CO, emissions is assumed to 
depend on the amount of the pollutant-emitting inputs 
used, but is independent of the technology applied. 
Given the traditional factor contents of the industries, 
we are of the opinion that accommodating substitution 
possibilities across inputs are small for countries such 
as Turkey which have not yet completed diversifica- 
tion of their industrial base.15 Thus, given our charac- 
terization, the specification error in inferring CO? 
emissions from industrial activity can be small. The 
emissions data are documented in Table 12. 
Product and factor markets are modeled following 
the classic hypotheses of me CGE literature: a CES 
aggregation of capital and labor for value-added and a 
separable specification for intermediate input use 
through fixed coefficients. For manufacturing indus- 
try, producers are hypothesized to command oligopo- 
listic mark-up pricing power and set price as average 
variable costs plus mark-ups. As suggested above, 
non-competitive behavior seems to be an important 
factor in explaining environmental abatement by 
Turkish industrialists in the 1990s. With market price 
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Table 12. Gaseous emissions and otherpollutants 
from industrial processes in Turkey (late 1980s) 
Ratio to Ratio to 
Aggregate industrial worker 
level* outputt employed* 
Emissions from industrial activity 
CO, 126,078 2.322 44.588 
SO* 354 0.007 0.125 
N4 175 0.003 0.062 
Ratio 
aggregate 
Aggregate energy 
level* demand? 
Emissions from energy production 
COZ 28140 21.158 
Sources:RPP(1994:Table24.1and24.5);OECD(1991:19). 
Notes: * thousand metric tons. 
t tons per million 1987 TL. 
$ tons per worker-year employment. 
determined a priori, industrial output is then demand- 
determined through endogenous movements of the 
rate of sectoral capacity utilization. 
In the factor markets, urban wage is assumed to be 
fixed exogenously in nominal terms. Thus, with mark- 
up pricing possibilities and the nominal wage rigidity, 
there is a nonhomogenous inflationary effect on the 
real economy. 
Given our discussion with respect to the behavior of 
mark-ups in section 2(b) above, we identify the 
changes in the nominal wage rate and the unemploy- 
ment rate (as a proxy for capacity utilization) as the 
main factors determining the changes in the mark-up 
rate. In the between period, dynamic stage of the 
model, we update the mark-ups and the (nominally 
fixed) urban-industrial wages using the observed rate 
of previous period inflation.16 
In an attempt o capture the fiscal strains of the state, 
aggregate public spending is treated as fixed, giving 
rise to fiscal deficit. The inflation tax, which is based 
on the endogenous solution of the aggregate price 
level, serves as the major adjustment mechanism in 
bringing forth the necessary transfer of resources from 
the private sector. 
The overall model is brought into equilibrium 
through endogenous iteration of product prices, the 
rural wage rate and the foreign exchange rate to clear 
the product markets, the rural labor market, and the 
current account. With nominal wage fixity, urban 
labor market clears on the short side via adjustments of 
urban employment. Labor hire decisions of firms are 
based on real wage calculations along profit-maximiz- 
ing rules. 
(c) Investigation of atemative policy scenarios 
We now investigate the macro incidences of alter- 
native policy scenarios, contrasting these against the 
benchmark path of the unchanged practices scenario 
over 1987-2000. The simulations are implemented via 
parametric manipulations of selected policy parame- 
ters around their “base-run” values. We examine three 
sets of issues: first, we look at the continued stance of 
relying on the indirect price (dis)-incentives, and study 
their longterm efficacy as instruments of emissions 
control (El). Second, we conceptualize an active envi- 
ronmental policy stance and introduce explicit targets 
to restrict aggregate CO, emissions in industrial pro- 
duction, to be sustained by the introduction of a direct 
carbon taxation scheme per ton of CO, emitted (E2). 
We rely on the CGE model to solve for the equilibrium 
carbon tax rate, given emissions restrictions. Finally, 
we inquire into an alternative closure rule in the prod- 
uct markets, and contrast the effects of competitive vs. 
oligopolistic mark-up pricing (E3). 
The growth path of the economy with current trends 
and current tax policies is spelled out in the “base-run” 
scenario. Here, the economy is totally driven by its 
endogenous dynamics of capital accumulation and 
population growth. Furthermore, we make the simpli- 
fying assumption that the exogenous foreign exchange 
variables, such as capital inflows and world prices 
remain unchanged at their initial 1987 levels. Under 
these assumptions, industry grows at an annual rate of 
0.7%,” and energy at an annual rate of 4.8% over 
1988-2000. Unemployment rate fluctuates around 
13%; private consumption grows by 1.8%, and private 
investment by 1.2%, per annum. CO, emissions from 
industrial production reach to a total of 138.5 thousand 
tons, and aggregate gaseous emissions of CO,, SO*, 
and NO* add up to 17 1.7 thousand tons in 2000. 
We first implement a parametric increase of the pro- 
duction tax rate in energy by 100% (El). We observe 
from Table 13 that the aggregate macro effects of this 
policy maneuver remain mild, and the net environ- 
mental effects are quite meager. Achieved rate of 
reduction of the CO, emissions in industry turns out be 
about 0.2%. Here the model captures the possibilities 
of profit maintenance at the technical level. With 
mark-ups, industrial relative price remains technically 
fixed and does not signal any change in real activity. 
This relatively weak response of gaseous pollution to 
indirect tax administration further suggests that the 
“marginal abatement cost” curve for such pollution 
may be low and/or flat, an observation which had been 
generalized for many developing economies in Taylor 
(1992). 
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Annual rates of growth, 1988-2000 
1987 Base 
(bil.TL) run El E2 E3 
Co, emissions* 
from industry 
from energy use 
126079.6 0.69 0.67 0.36 a.24 
28140.2 1.06 1.05 0.86 0.39 
Total gaseous emissions* 154748.8 0.75 0.73 0.45 XI.11 
Reduction rate in CO> emissions (relative to the base run) 
from industry (%) - - 
from energy use (%) - 
0.19 4.45 11.70 
0.23 2.91 8.68 
Carbon tax ratet - 37010 37010 
Production 
Agriculture 
Energy 
Industry 
Services 
13824.7 2.61 2.61 2.30 2.46 
3616.3 4.80 4.79 5.50 4.52 
54292.9 0.70 0.69 0.37 a.23 
32212.6 1.42 1.41 0.91 1.28 
Capacity utilization in 
industry (%)$ 100.0 97.1 97.6 99.8 
Unemployment rate (o/o)* 13.7 12.8 13.4 17.4 
100.0 
19.0 
Aggregate consumption 
Private 
Public 
46835.5 1.80 1.70 1.61 1.51 
6019.3 1.19 1.18 5.50 2.51 
Agregate investment 
Private 
Public 
7895.7 1.21 1.10 3.80 0.65 
9164.8 1.58 1.50 2.61 1.59 
Government’s fiscal balances 
Budget revenues 
Expenditures 
Fiscal deficit$ 
19298.5 1.11 
23010.6 1.20 
2769.0 2.18 
1.19 4.69 2.29 
1.20 3.81 2.03 
1.98 -5.10 0.24 
* Million metric tons. 
t TWton, 1987 prices, introduced in 1988. Average over 1988-2000 
f Average over 1988-2000. 
5 Net of foreign borrowing. 
We next introduce a carbon emissions ceiling in of about 4.7%. The model solutions reveal that the 
industry together with a direct tax on CO, emissions equilibrium carbon tax rate to accommodate emis- 
(E2). Technically the equilibrium tax rate should be sions restriction follows an exponential path. and 
interpreted as the shadow price of the emissions con- reaches up to 74.700 TL (1987 prices) in 2000, from 
trol constraint. We introduce the carbon emissions its initial level of 2,800 TL in 1988. The tax brings an 
ceiling at half the annual rate of growth of the base-run immediate additional source of 355.8 billion (1987 
path. Given the base-run accumulated increase of TL) in 1988, 2% of government’s total revenues of 
9.3% of industrial CO, emissions between that year. By the end of the period, however, revenues 
1987-2000, this means aggregate emissions savings from green taxes reach to 9621.5 billion (1987 TL); 
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which amount to 30% of total government revenues, 
or 11% of the gross domestic product. 
Given constant proportions of pollutant emission, 
the policy effectively reduces the growth rate of indus- 
trial production to half of its base-run value, and 
squeezes industrial value-added. Furthermore, with 
extra public revenues of green taxes, fiscal deficit nar- 
rows and the aggregate price level falls sharply. This 
price deflation is the major mechanism in adjusting the 
domestic economy to the new environmental policy. 
With the mark-up predetermining the relative price of 
industry vis-ri-vis other sectors, increased average 
costs lead to a severe deterioration of the terms of trade 
for agriculture and commerce. Consequently, non- 
industrial growth slows down. Urban unemployment 
rate increases by six percentage points, and equilib- 
rium rural wage rate is reduced by half in real terms. 
Clearly, under our rigid assumptions the environ- 
mental policy has direct and binding implications for 
industrial output and should be seen as the upper 
bound of policy effectiveness. In real life applications, 
we would expect both political and technological 
responses on the part of industrialists, issues that we 
are unable to capture. 
The potential size of the CO, tax revenues brings 
forth the issue of its disposition through government 
expenditures. In the current policy environment, rev- 
enues were simply added to the budget with no 
accommodating changes in the administration of 
existing taxes. Consequently, the enhanced revenue 
base found itself a vent in increased public consump- 
tion, a conceptualization which also represents the 
current Turkish reality of disinvestment by the state 
sector. One can also speculate on the use of carbon tax 
revenues to finance, for instance, trade liberalization 
or reducing accumulated debt. Under additional 
experiments that we do not report here, we tried to 
substitute the carbon tax for the current tariff protec- 
tion and observed that the simultaneous use of a car- 
bon tax with tariff reduction leads to a more severe 
acceleration in the path of the equilibrium carbon tax 
as compared to the previous experiment. This is 
because with tariff liberalization, aggregate demand 
increases and with Keynesian demand-determined 
adjustment in industry, output supply is stimulated. To 
maintain the existing level of restrictions on industrial 
emissions, hence on output supply, the shadow price is 
bid up. With rate of growth in industrial production 
effectively checked to the level of that in E2, other 
macro indicators also maintain their trends. Thus, we 
obtain similar rates of growth in other sectors, and the 
rural economy and the urban labor market continue to 
bear the burden of adjustment. 
Finally, we turn our focus to the issue of market 
structures. In many modelling exercises of environ- 
mental decision making, commodity and factor mar- 
kets are commonly assumed to be perfectly competi- 
tive. But, noncompetitive or missing market structures 
and politicized (regulated) managerial practices, often 
based on imperfect and biased information, are perva- 
sive facts of life. As argued earlier, in most Third 
World countries, the entrepreneurial class is itself a 
politicized agent created by the state apparatus, and the 
very process of noncompetitive profit-seeking behav- 
ior emanates from the cultural, social and economic 
conditions which regenerate themselves in various 
forms. Turkey, as discussed earlier, continues to suffer 
from noncompetitive producer behavior based on rent- 
seeking (see, inter alia, Yeldan, 1993). In the current 
specification of the model, we try to capture such 
behavior through the oligopolistic mark-up determina- 
tion of producer price in the industrial sector. 
Under E3, we implement a parametric hange in the 
market specification, and allow for competitive mar- 
ginal cost pricing rules in all sectors. To be able to con- 
trast the CO2 emission savings obtained under E3 with 
those of E2, we impose the solution rates of equilibrium 
carbon tax of E2 parametrically. Thus, given the CO, 
taxes solved under E2, E3 now solves for the achieved 
CO? savings obtained under competitive conditions. 
Given the same rates of green taxes, reductions 
obtained in aggregate CO, emissions are higher under 
the (hypothetical) competitive configuration. As 
Table 13 attests, oligopolistic producer behavior leads 
to a potential reduction in CO, emission savings of 
7.2% in industry, and 5.9% in energy, relative to the 
base run. In fact, aggregate emissions of gaseous pol- 
lutants are effectively reduced under the competitive 
setting (at a rate of 0.1%). Under the presence of oli- 
gopolistic pricing rules, per contra, existing policies 
fail to generate substantive savings in gaseous pollu- 
tion. The mark-up effectively protects the industrial 
profits and by fixing the relative price of industrial 
output against the other sectors, secures labor employ- 
ment and maintains the existing level of production. 
Thus, production and employment losses are milder 
under the oligopolistic environment of E2. Under 
competitive configuration, effective CO, taxation 
results in a more pronounced contraction of the econ- 
omy, and unemployment increases, on the average, by 
6.2 points over the base run. Thus, one can conclude 
that, environmental policy, which fails to achieve the 
desired results within an oligopolistic economy, can 
succeed in promoting its objectives under competitive 
conditions, albeit at significant output loss. Given oli- 
gopolistic pricing opportunities, producers can shift 
the burden of taxes to the final consumers, and to the 
extent that their profit margins are secured, emissions 
by polluting industries may persist, counteracting the 
expected desirable results of the environmentally 
sound policy instruments. 
It is a well-accepted fact that current global warm- 
ing due to carbon emissions is inherently a problem of 
“global commons”; and unless the potential major 
contributors to this process - many of them being 
newly industrializing Third World economies such as 
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India, China and Mexico - are brought under control, 
individual attempts to secure a pollution-free atmos- 
phere will fail. To the extent that pervasive noncompet- 
itive markets enable private interests to diverge from 
social objectives, environmental policy based on mar- 
ket incentives alone will not to achieve the desired ends. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Turkey’s post- 1980 experience with structural 
adjustment has been seen as a success story by many 
institutional and individual observers. Our study high- 
lights a number of problems and weaknesses usually 
disregarded by these circles. A distinguishing feature 
is the association of liberalization measures with 
chronic instability: high and fluctuating inflation rates 
and erratic changes in the current account of balance 
of payments have been pervasive features of the econ- 
omy when the economy was moving further and fur- 
ther toward liberalization. 
Looking into issues related to dynamics of income 
distribution and accumulation, it seems that the 
observed weaknesses are not merely due to a neglect 
of stabilization objectives. There are inherent difficulties 
with the neoliberal structural adjustment model, at least 
in the Turkish setting. A number of neo liberal expecta- 
tions with respect to resource allocation, rent-seeking, 
income distribution and growth potential failed to mate- 
rialize. A contradiction between the &uctmal ch;nacter- 
istics of the Turkish society and the simplified world of 
the neoliberal theory is, at least partly, responsible. 
A similar interpretation is possible with respect to 
environmental issues. To the extent that market struc- 
tures in Turkey diverge from the competitive model, 
environmental policies based on market incentives 
will not achieve desired ends. An active state appears 
to be the answer to many of the problems confronting 
the economy during the recent period. 
It is, however, well worth reflecting whether there is 
any practical sense to talk of economic policies with a 
longer perspective and which run counter to the inter- 
nationally prevailing conventional wisdom. Critical 
analysis is, as always, a powerful tool for interpreting 
and understanding the world; but, at this particular 
juncture, it is very doubtful whether it will have any 
impact on changing the world in which we live. 
NOTES 
1. For a similar kind of phasing, see ijnder and Ttirel(1993, 
pp. 123-128). 
2. Ttirel (1989) tends to interpret the passage into the third 
period as a shift from a demand-constrainedxprice to a sup- 
ply-constrained/flexprice regime. 
3. Parameters and variables estimated, used and derived for 
this decomposition exercise can be found in Borav. Ttirel and 
Yeldan (1994, pp. 11-12). 
4 In a recent econometric study on the subject, Akinci 
(1933, p. 45) concludes that “during (1963-91). ., the com- 
plementary character of public and private investments pre- 
vails over their substitutability.” For earlier studies in the 
same vein, see Conway (1990), Uygur (1991) (who also finds 
tradeoffs between private manufacturing and housing invest- 
ments) and Anand er al. (1990). 
5. For estimates of stagnant ICOR’s during the decade fol- 
lowing the late 1970s. see Uygur (1993, pp. 48-49). 
6. The bulk of electricity production in Turkey is carried out 
by thermal power stations (almost 60%). The quality of coal 
used in thermal plants is known to be of low grade with high 
sulphur content. The Ministry of Environment estimates, for 
instance. that about 45.000 tons of SO, are emitted annually 
from a typical coal-operated plant with 100 MW power 
capacity (Ministry of Environment, 1991). Thus, primary 
energy production has a serious detrimental effect on the 
environment. 
7. For similar observations, see Kazgan (1992, pp. 
337-343). 
8. See Boratav (1991, Table 1) for similar results using 
slightly different aggregations. 
9. The deviation between 1,-S, and PSBR is due to the inch- 
sion of a number of quasi-transfers and accounting categories 
which are not covered in the former, but included in the latter. 
Also note that in Table 4 of Section 2. PSBR was defined as 
I&. 
IO. ANkX (September 3. 1993). 
I 1. ANKA. (October 18. 1993 I. 
12. ErdemO993). 
13. These findings are from an OECD study as quoted by 
Arslan and Celasun (I 992). 
14. The international comparison of competitiveness is from 
Boratav, Ttirel and Yeldan (1994). 
15. Under CGE modeling exercises, pollution savings com- 
ing from such price-sensitive substitution possibilities are 
expected to be rapidly overcome by parametric fixity of 
input-output relations in intermediate input use. 
16. Formally, wage and mark-up adjustment mechanisms 
are bet as follows: 
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W,= W,_,((I+P,,)-a(l-~,P’-‘.~~, 
r,= Q-1 (l+P,_,) 
A full algebraic exposition of the model is given in Yeldan 
(1994). 
17. It has to be noted that the base-run path should not be 
wbereW,P,uandrstandforthenomioalwage.inflationrate, taken as a “‘projection” of the economy into 2000, but rather 
tmemploynkmt rate and the (nominal) mark-up ratio. a is an should be regarded solely as a “reference” point for policy 
adjustment m and A is the difference operator. simulations; since we abstain fmm issues of exogenous tech- 
nical change and focus on capital accumulation and labour 
Ma+dation by substituting Pout yields force expansion as sources of growth. 
r, = ‘r-1 Iw, + (l+u,,) &I A%,1 1 w,, 
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